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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
V-I OIL COMPANY,
a corporation,

Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8878

ANCHOR PETROLEUM
COMPANY,
Petitioner.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ON
INTERMEDIATE APPEAL

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We accept petitioner's statement of 'the case
and facts with the following:
For several years the plaintiff had been engaged in the business of selling gasoline and other
petroleun1 products, both wholesale and retail. This
did not include L.P. gas. The date the contract was
entered into, plaintiff did not have a sales organization for handling this product, and neither did
it have any customers. Both i'ts sales organization
and its market had to be developed. This was fully
1
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·known to the defendant (Dep. 30-31). In fact, the
defendant has agreed to and was assisting plaintiff to find a manager to handle 'this phase of its
business (Dep. 31-35).
The contract (R 3-5) was forwarded unsigned
to the plaintiff for its signing, provided it met with
its approval (Exhibit 2). Prior to plaintiff's signing it, however, plaintiff's manager talked with defendant by telephone, explaining it could not meet
the minimum requirements, because of not having
any customers and a sales organization, and he was
advised that this was of no importance and that i't
would furnish him with the rna terial he needed
(Dep 10-11). Following this conversation, the plaintiff signed the contract, returning i't on September
6, 1954 to defendant at Long Beach, California,
with a letter which stated:
Gentlemen:
Enclosed find contract executed which
you forwarded September 1, 1954.
It appears that we are going to be a little
slow in starting, but I am sure we will use
the total commitment in the next year.
'The defendant signed and returned the contra~t
to the plaintiff, who received it on September 10,
(Dep. 9). A third of the month of September had
passed. The plain tiff purchased no products in September. However, in October, it purchased 11,995
2
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gallons. In November, prior to defendants letter of
cancellation, it purchased 6,546 gallons. After the
delivery of the cancellation notice, plaintiff purchased and defendant delivered 13,053 gallons, or a
total of 19,599 gallons in the month of November.
(R. 20-21).
The aforementioned deliveries of L.P. gas were
made without protest or objection. The only objection raised by defendant was to plaintiff's sales
practice in reducing the retail price to its customers.
To this, defendant bitterly objected, because of the
protest of plaintiff's competitors (Dep. 13-15 & 27,
36-40).
After the contract was returned by defendant
to plaintiff, defendant on more than one occasion
advised plaintiff that the gallonage figures were of
no significance and 'that it would always supply him
with ·what products he needed (Dep. 10-11).
On December 3, 1954, the plaintiff (by registered mail) advised the defendant that it did not
agree with the cancellation of the contract and that
it expected the defendant to continue to furnish
it with the products covered by the agreement (Exhibit 6). This the defendant refused to do (Dep.
36-40).

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL WAS
A 'COUN'TER OFFER WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY
THE DEFENDANT.

We agree with defendant that a conditional
acceptance, one that imposes new terms or conditions is a rejection of the original offer, and constitutes a countr offer, which must be accepted.
'The contract was transmitted to the plaintiff
unsigned, by letter, for its consideration (Exhibit
2). The plaintiff, in view of it not having a L.P.
gas sales organization, nor a present market for the
product, recognized that it could not meet the monthly minimum requirement of 20,000 gallons per,
month, and so qualified its acceptance, after a telephone conversation, by its letter of transmittal (R.
6, Exhibit 3) , stating:
"It appears that we are going to be a
little slow in starting, but I am sure we will
use the total commitment in the next year."
This was a rejection of the defendants offer,
as it introduced a new condition, that is- it eliminated the minimum requirement of 20,000 gallons
per month with the provision, however, that it would
purchase 240,000 gallons during the year. This was
assented to by the defendant when it signed and
returned the contract to the plaintiff without objection.
:l
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It should be noted that the contract was signed
at Idaho Falls, Idaho by the plaintiff, sent to the
defendant at Long Beach, California on September
6th and returned signed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, who received it on September 10. The
contract was effective retroactive as of September
1 - the month was 'then one-third over.
We agree with the authorities cited by the petitioner under its Point I, pages 7-9, as 'to the law
pertaining to the offers and counter offers, and we
refer the court thereto.
In addition to the authorities cited by the petitioner, vve call the court's attention to the case of
American Lumber & Mfg. Co. vs. Atlantic Mill &
Lumber Co. ( 290 Fed. 632, 635), which says:
"Where one makes an offer and assents
'to an acception which is not responsive to the
proposal, a con tract is made and he is, of
course, bound by it''
An expressed assent to new terms and conditions attached to the acceptance of an offer is not
necessary in order to make such terms and conditions a part of the contract. Any conduct on the part
of the original offerer showing his assen't to the
modification of any terms and conditions of the
contract is sufficient to make such modification a
part of the contract. 135 ALR 822.
The defendant signed the contract and returned
5
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it to the plaintiff without comment as to the terms
imposed by the letter. However, he thereafter proceeded to deliver the products in line with the terms
imposed by the letter, namely: without objection,
no material was purchased or delivered in the month
of September; in the month of October, 11,995 gallons were purchased, and this was delivered without
objection, and in 'the month of November, prior to the
notification of cancellation, the defendant delivered
6,546 gallons. During this period, while the defendant objected to the plaintiff's price practices, it
made no objection to its failure to purchase what it
now claims the minin1um of 20,000 a month. The
first and only objection was by the letter of Novembel' 19.
In the case of American Lumber & Mfg. Co.
vs. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Co. ( 290 Fed. 632, 3rd.
Cir. Supra) 'the defendant ordered on one of its
forms 40 cars of yellow pine lumber, setting forth
its specifications, terms of payn1ent, ship1nent to
be made within a given time and to be consigned to
the defendant in the care of rail carrier at Cape·
Charles, Virginia. Plaintiff accepted in writing,
stating that payment was to be "Cash less 21~,
named the price f.o.b. and concluded with a statement that defendant's order is accepted according
to the conditions as outlined. Lu1nber was shipped
in part. Defendant then refused further ship1nent,
stating there was no contract because the plaintiff
6
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had failed to accept its counter offer. The court
held that, by its actions, the defendant had accepted
the counter offer by the ordering and acceptance
of the lumber. The court said:
"If the defendants written compliance
were all there was in the case to indicate the
meeting of the minds, there would be substance in the defendant's contention, for it is
elementary law that to make a valid con tract,
the meeting of the minds of the parties must
meet on the same terms in the same sense.
But the meeting of the minds of contracting
parties 1nay occur - and be shown - not by
words alone, but by conduct. Such conduct
may be that of either party, or, indeed, both
parties. In this case, however, the conduct was
that of the defendant, raising the questions
(or as we regard it) whether the contracts
sued upon were in existence, not because of
the plaintiff's conditional compliance with the
defendant's offer, but because of the defendant's assent to the conditions imposed by the
plaintiff in acceptance of the defendant's offers. Where one makes an offer and assents
to an acceptance which is not responsive to
the proposal, a con tract is made and he is,
of course, bound by it. The offerer's assent
to new terms in1posed by the offeree in his
acceptance may be inferred from the fact
that the parties therefrom proceeded 'to conduct business under the conditional accept~
ance.
See the following cases: Everett vs. Emmons
Coal Mining Co. ( 289 Fed. 686-6th Cir.), Bost.'Jn
Lumber Co. vs. Pendleton Bros. 129 A. 782, Comm.
Vaughom Sand Stone Inc. vs. Mon~is April & Bros.
7 A. 2nd 868.
7
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POINT II.
ASSUMING THAT THE DEFENDAN'T'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT IS CORRECT,
PLAINTIFF, NEVERTHELESS, WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AS THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED TH~
PROVISIONS AS TO MINIMUM 1\iONTH'LY REQUIREMEN·TS.

Assuming that defendant's interpretation of
the contract was correct, that no new conditions was
imposed by plaintiffs' letter, the plaintiff was not
in default for the defendant, by i'ts failure to object
to the plaintiff's failure to purchase any products
during the month of September and its delivery to
the plaintiff of 11,995 gallons in October, waived
the breach, if any, for such months, and in 'the
month of November, plaintiff substantially performed the contract as to such minimum requirements
by purchasing 19,599 gallons. The first and only
objection for failure to purchase was by the letter
of termination of the contract on November 19, to
which termination the plaintiff took exception.
The Supreme Court of Washington, in an analogous situation, in the case of Yours Truly Biscuit
Co. vs. ·Chas. H. Lilly Co. (253 Pac. 817) held a
waiver where the plaintiff corporation, although
placing its order wi'th the defendant corporation on
January 28, 1924, for 2000 barrels of flour at a
specified price to be delivered as wanted by April
1, 19'24, only took 240 barrels by April 1, and after
the expiration of the time provided in the contract
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the plaintiff continued to order and the defendant
delivered additional flour up until August 25, 1924,
at which time 654 barrels had been delivered. The
plaintiff ordered again on September 8 and was
advised the contract had been canceled for failure
to accept deli very of flour according to 'the terms of
the contract. 'The plaintiff as here refused to recognize the cancellation. In this case, the court said :
"Since the third ground is decisive of the
rights of the parties, and we are disposed to
hold that the assignment is well taken, we
shall c~iscuss only that question. There is no
dispute in the record that all deliveries of
flour after April 1, were made under the
contract, for each invoice bears upon i'ts face a
statement so shov1ing. Now, where a contract
has a provision fixing a time for performance,
and the party who has the right to enforce
the provision fails to do so, but continues the
contract past the date of expiration by accepting and filling orders thereunder, can
such party at any time he so elects cancel instanter the contract? The authorities answer
this question in the negative, and the basis
of 'the holdings seems to be that, where one
by his conduct has caused the other to believe
that he has waived a provision which was
placed there for his benefit, and considers the
contract in full force and effect, common honesty between men requires that, if he subsequently desires to enforce 'the provision,
reasonable time must be given the other party
to comply with the terms of the contract. The
rule is tersely stated in 24 R. C. L. p. 284, as
follows:
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"Through the right of one party to
terminate the contract for the default of
the other party is recognized, still he has
the right to treat the contract as continuing, the right to terminate being given for
his benefit; and it seems to be generally
recognized that, if he ·wishes to exercise this
right, he must give reasonable notice of his
election to do so to the party in default,
else he will be deemed to have waived his
right of termination on account of such
past 'breaches."
The defendant not only delivered the material,
without objection, as aforementioned, but on several
occasions in addition thereto advised the plaintiff
that the requirements, both as to minimun1 and maximum gallonage were of no significance and tha't it
could disregard them. (Dep. 10-11). VVhat more
need there be to constitute a waiver?
The purchase by the defendant in November
of 19,599 gallons was a substantial performance of
the contract and, where there is a substantial p~t:
formance, i't gives no right of cancellation. (12
Am. J ur., Sec. 343, Page 900).
In any event, the defendant did not give the
plaintiff notice that it expected it thereafter to comply with the minimum gallonage requirements, if
any existed, but on the contrary, served him with
notice of cancellation of the contract. Irrespective
of whether during the month of November, the
plaintiff purchased 20,000 or 40,000 gallons fron1
10
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the defendant, it said it would not thereafter deliver to the plaintiff any additional products.
Plaintiff contends that, at the very least, defendant's acceptance of defective installments during the months of September and October woud justify to a reasonable person that performance of that
character was sa tifsactory. (See Washington case,
Yours Truly Biscuit Co. vs. Chas. H. Lilly Co.
Supra). Also see Re-statement of Contract, Sec. 300,
which is quoted at page 18 of Petitioner's Brief.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Commerce
Casualty Company vs. Campbell ( 188 S. E. 363)
held that a provision against waiver may itself be
\vaived. It said:
"A provision against waiver may itself
be waived."
It should be kept in mind that the defendant
did not notify the plaintiff at any 'time that it expected it to comply with the provisions of the contract as to minimum requirements. It merely gave
ndtice of cancellation.
The plaintiff was not in default, when notified
of cancellation of the contract by defendant. This
was on "anticipatory breach", which gave the plaintiff an immediate right of action and excused it of
performance on its part. 12 Am. J ur. p. 970, Sec.
392, 17 C.J.S. p. 973, Sec. 472.
This court in Jordan vs. Madsen et al, 252 Pac.
570, 69 Utah 112, said:
11
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"It, of course, is well settled that a renunciation or repudiation of a contract by
one party before the time fixed for performance constitutes a breach and gives an immediate right of action to the adverse party.
5 Page on Contracts,§ 2885; 13 C.J. 651 * * *.
The breach here as alleged operated as a discharge of the contract, which gave the plaintiff, who was not in default, the right to ig-=
nore the contract as a basis of his rights and
to sue as he did in quasi contract to recover
reasonable compensation for what he furnished in partial performance of the contract
( 5 Page on Contract § 3023) - here the value
of his old car, alleged to be $900. The renunciation discharged the plaintiff fron1 further
performance. 5 Page, § 2883; 13 C.J. 653.
POINT III.
IN ANY EVENT, THERE VvAS A l\tiODIFICATION
OF THE TERlVIS OF THE CONTRACT AS TO MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM REQUIRElVfENTS.

The contract provided that the n1inimum and
maximum requirements, if any, could be changed
by mutual agreement. It said:
"The quantity shall be all of the buyer's
requirements up to a maximum quantity of
40,000 gallons per month and a 1ninimun1
quantity of 20,000 gallons per 1nonth, quantity subject to change by n1utual agreement.
We have no quarrel with the authorities cited
by the petitioner to the effect that parole evidence
is not admissable to vary the terms of a written
agreement, however, it fails to recognize that the
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provisions of a con'tract may be modified and that
the modification can be shown by parole evidence.
12 Am. J ur. Sec. 428 p. 1006.
Should this court determine that the contract
was subject to 'the minimum requirement and not
modified by the letter of acceptance, plaintiff, nevertheless, urges that it was subsequently modified by
the defendant's agreeing that the gallonage figures
were of no significance and tha't it would always
supply him with quantities needed. (Dep. 10-11).
POINT IV.
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY
NOT BE GRANTED WHERE A GENUINE ISSUE OF
FACTS EXISTS AND DOUBT MUST BE RESOLVED
AGAINST THE MOVING PARTY.

See the following: Moore's Fed. Practice, 2nd
Ed. Vol 6, Sec. 56. 04, pages 2028-2034, and Sec.
556.15, pages 2101-2121, 212'3-2133. Traylor vs.
Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 189 F. 2d 213, Chappel vs.
Goltsman, 186 F 2d 215, Arnstein vs. Porter, 154
F. 2d 464, Whittlin vs. Giacalone, 154 F. 2d 20;
Parmelee vs. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F. 2d,
582; 158 A.L.R. 1130; Hawkins vs. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., 154 F. 2nd 88; Toelelman vs. MissouriKansas Pipe Line c.~., 130 F. 2d, 1016.
SUMMARY
1. Plaintiff's letter of transmittal constituted
a counter offer as it imposed new conditions which
were assented to by the defendant, namely, the
13
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monthly minimum requirement was eliminated from
the defendant's offer, and this interpretation of the
contract was placed upon it by 'the defendant by its
acts, at least it raised a question of fact which can
not be resolved on motion for summary judgment.
2. In any event, if the minimum purchase
requirements were not eliminated from the contract,
the defendant, by its actions, waives such provision
or, at least it raises a question of fact that can not
be resolved on motion for summary judgment.
3. In any event, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the minimum and maximum requirements were to be eliminated from the contract
subsequent to its execution and this may be shown
by parole evidence.
4. That if there is any question as to whether
or not plaintiff's letter of transmittal constituted
a counter offer, the contract is then ambiguous and
parole evidence is admissible to show the real intent
of the parties.
In line with the foregoing, it is respectfully
submitted that the court did not err in denying the
defendant's motion for sum1nary judgment and its
order should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
L. DELOS DAINES
Attorney for Respondent
822 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
1·1
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